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Oil Spills and Dishonesty: Did BP Commit Securities Fraud
Regarding Pipeline Leaks in Alaska?
Reese v. Malone1
Adam Wilson
I. INTRODUCTION
In Reese v. Malone, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals revived a
class action securities fraud suit against BP. The court overturned the
district court’s finding and held that statements made by BP and its
executives in the wake of two separate oil pipeline leaks in Alaska were
actionable as being intentionally misleading. The court held that all but
one of the statements at issue had the potential to mislead the public and,
more specifically, BP’s investors. While BP has already been found
criminally and civilly liable for the harm that these oil spills caused to the
environment, BP will again face civil liability for its alleged attempts to
conceal its degree of fault in causing and allowing that harm to occur.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellants are BP shareholders (“Appellants”), who filed a class
action suit against BP; BP Exploration Alaska (“BP-Alaska”), an Alaskabased, wholly-owned subsidiary of BP; John Browne, BP's CEO during the
class period; and Maureen Johnson, who was BP-Alaska's Senior Vice
President during the class period.2 Appellants' action is based on two oil
spills from leaks in separate oil pipelines operated by BP-Alaska in the
Prudhoe Bay area of northern Alaska.3 The first spill was discovered on
March 2, 2006, coming from a hole in the Western Operating Area (“WOA”)
line.4 It is estimated the leak went undetected for at least five days, and
1

Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 563.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 564.
2
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spilled approximately 4,800 barrels of oil onto Alaskan tundra.5 In August of
the same year, the second spill was detected as another twenty-five barrels of
oil leaked from the Eastern Operating Area (“EOA”) line on the opposite side
of Prudhoe Bay.6 As a result, BP temporarily shut down operations in the
Prudhoe Bay oil field.7
Both spills were the result of internal corrosion in the WOA and EOA
pipelines, which BP knew to have similar characteristics that caused them to
have the same high level of risk for corrosion.8 The main process of pipeline
maintenance in the oil and gas industries is known as “pigging,” in which a
cleaning tool is sent through the line.9 “Smart pigging” is a process used to
detect the presence of corrosion and cracks in the pipeline.10 BP eventually
admitted that it pigged its Prudhoe Bay lines infrequently, at a rate
significantly below industry standards for that type of pipeline, and used less
accurate methods of monitoring for internal corrosion.11 Investigations
revealed that BP had not tested the WOA's integrity with a smart pig since
1998,12 nor the EOA since 1990.13
On March 15, 2006, the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) issued a
Corrective Action Order (“CAO”) to BP-Alaska, addressed to Maureen
Johnson, Vice President of BP-Alaska, as well as the Greater Prudhoe Bay
Performance Unit Leader.14 The CAO's preliminary findings identified
multiple additional spots with severe corrosion, including one area with only
0.04 inches of wall remaining, and also noted the similarities in conditions
5

Id.
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 566. These factors included low crude oil flow velocities, corrosivity of the
material being transported, the presence of water and sediments, and lack of or
ineffective maintenance. Id.
9
Id. at 563.
10
Id. at 563-64.
11
Id. at 564.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 573.
14
Id. at 564.
6
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and risks for corrosion between all three of BP's Prudhoe Bay pipelines.15
The CAO stated that “'continued operation of BP's WOA, EOA, and Lisburne
hazardous liquid pipelines without corrective measures would be hazardous
to life, property and the environment,'” and ordered, among other things, that
BP smart pig all three lines within certain deadlines.16 BP's inspection of the
EOA line (which missed its deadline by a month and was completed only two
weeks before the second spill) revealed numerous severely corroded areas in
that line as well.17
Following the second spill, in 2007, BP-Alaska pled guilty to a
violation of the Clean Water Act, agreeing to pay a $20 million fine.18 In the
plea agreement, BP admitted that it was aware of corrosion in the WOA
pipeline in 2005, the company's “'insufficient inspection data'” on the EOA
line, and the risk factors for corrosion in both lines.19 In 2011, BP settled
civil suits brought by the Department of Justice and the State of Alaska,
agreeing to pay $25 million in damages and to make $60 million in
improvements to its pipelines in Alaska.20
In the instant case, appellants allege that BP knowingly, or with
deliberate recklessness, made false and misleading statements about the
condition of its pipelines, and its pipeline maintenance and leak detection
practices, prior to and after the first spill.21 Appellants seek relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for investment losses incurred when the
spills and subsequent shutdown allegedly caused a significant decline in BP's
share price.22 The shareholders' appeal focuses on four types of false or
misleading statements: (1) a press statement made by Maureen Johnson two
weeks after the March spill that stated inspection data from prior to the spill
indicated that corrosion was occurring at a low and manageable rate; (2) two
press statements by Johnson suggesting that the first spill was anomalous and
distinguishing the WOA line from the others in Prudhoe Bay; (3) a press
statement by BP's CEO John Browne that the March spill occurred “'in spite
15

Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 565.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 566.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 563.
22
Id.
16
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of the fact that [BP] has both world class corrosion monitoring and leak
detection systems'”; and (4) a statement in BP's 2005 Annual Report (which
was issued in June of 2006)23 stating that management believed BP was in
compliance, in all material respects, with applicable environmental laws and
regulations.24
Appellees argue that Johnson, Browne, and other BP executives made
those statements, not with the intent to mislead or deceive investors, but
because they misunderstood or did not have access to BP's data,25 and
because some of the data was incomplete.26 As to the statement in the annual
report, Appellees argue that it was not intentionally false or misleading
because the report used the phrases “'management believes,'” and
“'compliance in all material respects'” (emphasis added).27
Initially, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Appellees'
motion to dismiss, finding that only one of twenty-five allegedly false and
misleading statements was actionable under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.28 On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court reversed,
concluding that the statement was not false or misleading.29 Appellants
amended their complaint to include several facts and allegations, based on
information that came to light during the investigations and lawsuits arising
from the spills.30 The trial court dismissed the amended complaint in its
entirety, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.31 It found that, while
some of Appellees' statements were actionably false, Appellants did not plead
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.32

23

Id. at 569, 572-73, 577.
Id. at 567.
25
Id. at 571.
26
Id. at 573.
27
Id. at 578-79.
28
Id. at 566.
29
Id.; See Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011).
30
Reese, 747 F.3d at 567.
31
Id.
32
Id.
24
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part,
remanding the case back to the trial court.33 The instant court agreed with the
trial court that the statement made by Browne34 was not actionable,35 but held
that the other three types of statements36 were.37 The court ultimately held
that a securities fraud claim is adequately pled, with respect to the elements
of material falsity and scienter (which are required to state a securities fraud
claim),38 when the complaint specifies each statement alleged to have been
false or misleading and the reasons why it is so,39 and suffices to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence satisfying the
materiality requirement.40 When the complaint states with particularity facts,
that when taken together and reviewed holistically, give rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with scienter, this inference is at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent.41
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Appellants' complaint arises in part under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance . . . .”42 The complaint also arises under Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which was promulgated by the
33

Id. at 581.
I.e. the press statement by BP's CEO John Browne that the March spill occurred “'in
spite of the fact that [BP] has both world class corrosion monitoring and leak detection
systems.'” Id. at 577.
35
Id. at 577.
36
I.e. the press statement made by Maureen Johnson two weeks after the March spill that
stated inspection data from prior to the spill indicated that corrosion was occurring at a
low and manageable rate; the two press statements by Johnson suggesting that the first
spill was anomalous and distinguishing the WOA line from the others in Prudhoe Bay;
and the statement in BP's 2005 Annual Report stating that management believed BP was
in compliance, in all material respects, with applicable environmental laws and
regulations. Id. at 59, 573-73, 577.
37
Id. at 577, 581.
38
Id. at 567 (citing Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008)).
39
Id. at 568 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012)).
40
Id. (citing Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011)).
41
Id. at 568-69 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 1324).
42
747 F.3d at 563; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
34
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Securities and Exchange Commission.43 Similar to §10(b), Rule 10b-5
makes it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.”44 The Supreme Court of the United States has established that
to state a claim of securities fraud, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation.”45
At the pleading stage of claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a
complaint must satisfy the dual pleading requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”).46 Rule 9(b) requires that claims alleging fraud be subject to a
heightened pleading requirement. As such, a party must “state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”47 In addition,
private securities fraud complaints are subject to the requirements of the
PSLRA which requires that such a complaint plead with particularity both
falsity and scienter.48 As a result, the two issues reached in the instant case
were whether the appellants' complaint had adequately pled (i.e. with
particularity) material falsity and scienter.49
A. Falsity and Materiality
In order to plead falsity, a complaint must “specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason why the statement is

43

Reese, 747 F.3d at 567 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2014).
45
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
46
Reese, 747 F.3d at 568 (citing In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694,
701 (9th Cir. 2012)).
47
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
48
Reese, 747 F.3d at 568 (citing Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981,
990 (9th Cir. 2009)).
49
Id. at 568-69.
44
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misleading.”50 If an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made
on information and belief, the complaint must “state with particularity all
facts on which that belief is formed.”51 Such a statement of belief is a
“'factual' misstatement actionable under Section 10(b) if (1) the statement is
not actually believed, (2) there is no reasonable basis for the belief, or (3) the
speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the
statement's accuracy.”52
In Glazer Capital Mgmt. v. Magistri, the court held that statements of
legal compliance are adequately pled with regards to falsity when a
complaint references documents detailing specific violations of law that
existed at the time the warranties were made.53 In Glazer, the court held that
a statement averring “compliance in all material respects” was actionably
false because the complaint pointed to an SEC cease and desist order
detailing violations of law, even though the order was issued eleven months
after the statement was made.54 Courts have also held that statements are
misleading, and thus actionable, when they create the idea of certainty in a
situation that previously indicated risk.55 For example, in Berson v. Applied
Signal Tech, Inc., the court stated that “[i]t goes without saying that investors
would treat [risk and certainty] differently.”56
In addition to falsity, the materiality of a misrepresentation or
omission of fact is central to a 10b-5 claim.57 A statement is material when
there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
50

15 U.S.C. § 78u(b)(1)(B) (2012).
Id.
52
Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994).
53
Glazer, 549 F.3d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2008).
54
Id.
55
See, e.g., Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008).
56
Id. In Berson, the court held that, in a claim of violations of Securities and Exchange
Act § 10(b) and 10b-5 for losses allegedly incurred due to a company’s misleading
practice of counting as “backlog” contracted work not yet performed but for which the
dollar value was reported, without disclosing that backlog included millions of dollars of
halted contract work for which stop-work orders had been issued, the reporting of
backlog would have misled reasonable investors. Id. at 984-87.
57
Reese, 747 F.3d at 568 (citing In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.
2010)).
51
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the 'total mix' of information made available.”58 In order to adequately plead
materiality, a complaint's allegations must suffice to “'raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' satisfying the materiality
requirement,”59 and “'allow the court to draw the reasonable inference [of
liability].'”60 Conclusory allegations of law and spurious inferences are not
enough to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.61
Facts demonstrating public interest in withheld information support
the information's materiality.62 In In re 2themart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., the
court found that public interest in the company's website development on an
online message board was evidence of materiality.63
B. Scienter
Scienter is defined as a mental state of intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud.64 For a complaint to adequately plead scienter, it must “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.”65 In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., a class action suit brought by investors alleging securities fraud, the
Supreme Court set forth an analysis for determining whether a complaint
gives rise to a strong inference of scienter, specifically when reviewing a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.66
Under the Tellabs analysis, a court must accept a complaint's factual
allegations as true, and must consider the complaint in its entirety, including
58

Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1976) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
59
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
60
Id. (quoting Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2008)).
61
In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Circ. 2010).
62
In re 2themart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (C.D. Ca. 2000).
63
Id. (the court held that, in deciding whether materiality has been adequately pled in a
Securities and Exchange Act § 10 b-5 claim, public interest in the company’s website
development on an online message board was evidence of materiality). Id.
64
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n. 12 (1976).
65
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012).
66
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, LTD.,et al., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, as well as matters of
which a court may take judicial notice.67 The court must review all of the
allegations holistically to determine whether scienter is adequately pled.68
The key question is “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give
rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation,
scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard.”69 In this analysis, a strong
inference of scienter need not be irrefutable, but “must be more than merely
plausible or reasonable — it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent.”70 In other words, the court
must weigh inferences of scienter against plausible, nonculpable explanations
for the defendant's conduct.71
To satisfy the scienter requirement, it must be inferred that the
defendant made false or misleading statements “'either intentionally or with
deliberate recklessness.'”72 In the context of securities fraud, an actor is
deliberately reckless “'if he had reasonable grounds to believe material facts
existed that were misstated or omitted, but nonetheless failed to obtain or
disclose such facts although he could have done so without extraordinary
effort.'”73 Evidence, such as internal documents or disclosures, of an actor's
contemporaneous knowledge of facts, which shows her statements to be false
or misleading, is the most direct way to create a strong inference of
scienter.74 For example, if an actor directly references relevant data that is
contradictory to her statements, or if the complaint makes detailed and
specific allegations about management's exposure to factual information
within the company, there is a strong inference of scienter.75 On the other
hand, if the defendant can show that information was obscured from the actor
or high-level executives, this can outweigh any inference of scienter.76 This
67

Id. at 322.
Id. at 309-10; Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siacusana, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324 (2011).
69
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323.
70
Id. at 309.
71
Id. at 323-24.
72
Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting In
re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2005)).
73
Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 569 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Oracle Corp. Sec.
Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 390 (9th Cir. 2010)).
74
Id. at 572 (citing Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d
1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004)).
75
S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 783, 785 (9th Cir. 2008).
76
Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2008).
68
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was the case in Glazer Capital Management, where there were no facts
showing that the company’s CEO was personally aware of illegal activity
within the company.77
However, mere temporal proximity between the statements and later
disclosures or documents is circumstantial evidence of scienter, and can only
bolster the inference.78 Likewise, facts showing mere recklessness or a
motive and opportunity to commit fraud provide some reasonable inference
of intent and should be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances,
but are not independently sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter.79
In addition to allegations being viewed holistically, to create a strong
inference of scienter under the Tellabs standard, allegations may help satisfy
the PSLRA scienter requirement in two other circumstances.80 One of these
circumstances is when the allegations are particular and suggest that the
defendants had actual access to the disputed information.81 In In re Daou
Systems, the Court held that the plaintiffs pled scienter based on specific
allegations of the defendants' direct involvement in the making of false
accounting statements and reports.82 In Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local
144 v. Oracle, the Court held that it was reasonable to infer that the
defendant-executives were aware of major accounting irregularities because
of specific allegations regarding the executives' detail-oriented management
style.83
77

Id. at 745.
Reese, 747 F.3d at 574-75. See Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 437 (9th Cir. 2001).
79
In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). See also
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007); see also In re
Daou Systems, 411 F.3d 1006, 1024 (9th Cir. 2005).
80
Reese, 747 F.3d 557, 575-76 (9th Cir. 2014).
81
S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2008); See Nursing Home
Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle, 380 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2004).
82
Daou, 411 F.3d at 1023 (holding that, in deciding whether scienter has been adequately
pled in a Securities and Exchange Act § 10(b) claim (i.e. whether allegations satisfy the
PLSRA standard), plaintiffs’ making specific allegations of the defendants’ direct
involvement in the making of false accounting statements and reports helped satisfy the
standard because they were particular and suggested that the defendants had actual access
to the disputed information). Id.
83
Oracle, 380 F.3d at 1234 (holding that, in deciding whether scienter has been
78
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In another circumstance, allegations may be sufficient to satisfy the
PSLRA scienter requirement, without being particular, when the relevant
facts are so prominent that it would be “absurd” to suggest management did
not have knowledge of the matter.84 This is based off of the principle that it
is often reasonable to conclude high-ranking corporate officers have
knowledge of the critical core operations of their companies, and this “core
operations inference” may be enough to raise a strong inference of scienter.85
In Berson, the plaintiffs alleged no specific facts to demonstrate that
individually named corporate officers (i.e. defendants) had actual knowledge
about customers' stop-work orders on large contracts.86 These stop-work
orders caused a significant drop in the defendant company's actual revenue,
but continued to be counted as revenue via a misleading accounting trick,
which formed the basis of the suit.87 Despite the lack of specific facts
showing the officers' knowledge, the court held that there was a strong
inference of scienter based on the officers' positions and the nature of the
misstatements.88 The court held that the officers were “directly responsible
for [the company's] day-to-day operations,” and the stop-work orders “were
prominent enough that it would be 'absurd to suggest' that top management
was unaware of them.”89
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
analyzed separately whether falsity and scienter were adequately pled for
each of the four statements at issue.

adequately pled in Securities and Exchange Act § 10(b) and 10 b-5 claims (i,e. whether
allegations satisfy the PLSRA standard), it was reasonable to infer that the defendantexecutives were aware of major accounting irregularities because of specific allegations
regarding the executives' detail-oriented management style, and that those allegations
helped satisfy the standard because they were particular and suggested that the defendants
had actual access to the disputed information). Id.
84
Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
85
S. Ferry, 542 F.3d at 785-86.
86
Berson, 527 F.3d at 987.
87
Id. at 983.
88
Id. at 987-88.
89
Id.
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A. Johnson's Assurances About the Low Manageable Corrosion Rate
The court began by discussing the press statement made by BPAlaska's VP, Maureen Johnson, two weeks after the March spill, in which she
stated corrosion had been seen in the WOA pipeline in a September 2005
inspection, “'but appeared to be occurring at a “low manageable. . . .
corrosion rate.”’”90
In assessing falsity, the court considered the allegation that BP’s
internal documents showed the corrosion rate in one tested area was 32
mills91 per year (“MPY”) in 2005, compared to just 3 MPY in 2004.92 A rate
above 30 MPY is the highest of three levels in BP's own classification
system, and an expert for the Appellants opined that such a corrosion rate
was “high” and “not manageable.”93 Appellees argued that Johnson's
statement was simply incomplete because only one of many tested locations
had a corrosion rate of 32 MPY.94 However, the court held Johnson's
statement effectively denied that BP had any warning of high corrosion
before the first spill, and was thus objectively misleading.95 BP's awareness
of the corrosion level was a key question raised by media and government
investigators, demonstrating public interest in the withheld information; the
court held this supported the statement's materiality.96 As such, the court
agreed with the trial court that the Appellants had adequately pled material
falsity of this statement.97
The larger issue is whether Appellants adequately pled Johnson's
scienter. The court noted Johnson was directly responsible for pipeline
operations in Prudhoe Bay, and holds a Ph.D. in Environmental Science and
Engineering. Following the first spill, Johnson had every reason to review
and understand BP's corrosion monitoring data to determine what happened
90

Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 569 (9th Cir. 2014).
A mill is equal to one thousandth of an inch. Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 569-70.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 570.
97
Id. at 569.
91
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and assess the possibility of future spills.98 Based on this belief, the court
held that if anyone knew of the deficiencies in BP's monitoring program and
the likelihood of pipeline failures, it was Johnson.99 The complaint stated
Johnson's involvement in working with government organizations to comply
with the CAO, and her responsibility for reporting to BP executives about the
first spill.100 Because BP's corrosion monitoring practices and the spill's
preventability were the focus of public and government inquiries, the court
held Johnson had a clear motive for omitting information about the presence
of high corrosion levels.101 The court also held the appellants did not need to
show Johnson had the intent to deceive investors about the likelihood of
future spills, as the trial court found necessary, rather it was enough to show
she had known her statement was materially misleading.102
The Ninth Circuit Court then went on to discuss the Tellabs analysis
conducted by the trial court, which concluded the inference that Johnson
intended to mislead investors was outweighed by opposing inferences that
she misunderstood or did not have access to BP's data.103 The instant court
noted that in a Tellabs analysis, courts must only weigh plausible competing
inferences.104 Because the detected corrosion levels were the highest in BP's
classification system and had dramatically increased, and because of
Johnson's role, the responsibilities of her position, and her expertise as a
doctor of engineering, the court held that it was simply implausible that she
had misunderstood BP's data.105 The fact that Johnson specifically addressed
the corrosion data in her statement directly contradicts the inference that she
did not have access to the data, making it implausible as well, according to
the court.106 Thus, the court held that when considering the totality of the
circumstances, the Appellants pled facts which created a strong inference of
scienter that outweighed opposing inferences.107

98

Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 571.
100
Id. at 570.
101
Id. at 571.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 572.
106
Id.
107
Id.
99
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B. Johnson's Statements Distinguishing the WOA and EOA Lines
The court next looked at two press statements made by Johnson after
the first spill. In the first statement, she stated the problems that caused the
March spill were unique to the WOA line. In the other statement, she said
that none of the other transit lines had the same combination of factors which
contributed to the first spill, including bacteria within the pipeline and a low
flow rate.108
The court noted that after the second spill, BP-Alaska admitted to
regulators the causal factors most influential to corrosion, including low flow
velocity leading to microbiologically induced corrosion, were present in both
the WOA and EOA lines.109 The court referenced two more documents from
2006 and 2007 showing BP's acknowledgement that microbiologically
induced corrosion was the cause of both spills, promoted by several similar
characteristics of both lines, including low flow velocities and a lack of
maintenance pigging.110 Based on those documents, the court held that the
appellants had adequately pled the falsity of Johnson's statement.111
Appellees argued that the statements were not false or materially
misleading because they were based on BP-Alaska's preliminary assessments,
which were subject to change.112 However, the statements do not imply that
the findings were preliminary or incomplete, and the second statement
indicates it was based on post-spill inspections.113 Because of this, and the
fact that the complaint contained information suggesting BP was aware of the
high risk of corrosion and the deficiencies in its monitoring and maintenance
practices, the court rejected this argument.114 It also rejected the argument
that the statements were not misleading because the public was aware of the

108

Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 573.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
109

147

OILSPILLS AND DISHONESTY
lines' similarities; the statements directly, and with certainty, contradicted the
general similarities noted in the CAO.115
Again, the more contentious issue was whether Johnson's scienter was
pled adequately. The trial court found it plausible that Johnson's statements
only summarized preliminary results of an ongoing investigation, and that
Appellants did not show Johnson was aware her statements were false.116
The trial court dismissed each of the three documents contradicting Johnson's
statements, and other information gleaned through discovery and admissions,
as inconclusive evidence of scienter because the documents and information
were dated after Johnson made her statements.117 The instant court noted
that, although the subsequent statements and disclosures cannot, standing
alone, establish scienter, they provide strong circumstantial evidence towards
the inference of scienter considering the relatively constant, long-term nature
of the information.118 Furthermore, the court stated there was nothing in the
record to suggest that flow velocity or risk of corrosion were ever factors that
differed between the WOA and EOA lines.119 Based on the circumstantial
evidence, and the inference that key officers have knowledge of the “core
operations” of a company, the court held it could impute scienter to Johnson
given the totality of the circumstances.120
The court engaged in further analyses expounding on the core
operations inference.121 Due to Johnson's roles in overseeing pipeline
operations in Prudhoe Bay and communicating directly with regulators, BP
leadership, and the press after the March spill, the court concluded that
Johnson appeared to have been both the external and internal gatekeeper of
information on the Prudhoe Bay pipelines.122 In conducting an absurdity
analysis, the court noted BP admitted to treating the pipelines identically for
monitoring purposes based on their similarity, and that Johnson must have
been aware of the lack of data on the EOA line because she would have to
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have known it had not been smart pigged in sixteen years.123 The court held
such information is the epitome of “core” to pipeline operations in Prudhoe
Bay, and the information it imputes to Johnson was fundamental to the
operations of her business.124 Thus, the court concluded it is absurd to think
Johnson was unaware of the information.125
The court then conducted the “actual access” analysis, holding
Johnson's statements were her own specific representations of the company's
findings and reflect her access to the information at issue.126 Noting there is
a stronger inference of scienter here than in situations where executives are
held responsible for the falsity of accounting statements, the court held the
actual access analysis supports scienter.127 The court concluded by holding
that the absurdity and actual access analyses, as well as the totality of the
circumstances under the Tellabs analysis, make the inference of scienter
irresistible, and outweighs the opposing, speculative inference that Johnson
was merely summarizing a preliminary investigation.128
C. Statement Regarding BP's “World Class” Leak Detection and
Corrosion Monitoring Systems
Next, the court looked at the third statement type in the complaint, a
press statement on April 25, 2006, by BP's CEO John Browne to the effect
that the March spill occurred “in spite of the fact that [BP has] both world
class corrosion monitoring and leak detection systems, both being applied
within regulation set by the Alaskan authorities.”129 The court agreed with
the trial court that the statement was false, as investigations revealed the
pipelines were under-inspected, under-maintained, and had a severe risk of
corrosion-related failure.130
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The court also agreed with the district court that the appellants did not
allege facts that independently created a strong inference of scienter based on
the timing of the statement and the totality of the circumstances.131 The
appellants did not set forth facts supporting the inference that Browne had
actual access to contradictory information, because BP's Board of Directors
did not receive a detailed update until ten days after Browne made the
statement, and the CAO against BP-Alaska did not speak of specific legal
violations.132 Accordingly, the instant court upheld the trial court with
respect to Browne's statement.133
D. Annual Report Statement Regarding Compliance with Environmental
Laws and Regulations
The final statement analyzed by the court was contained in BP's 2005
annual report, which was issued on June 30, 2006: “Management believes
that the Group's activities are in compliance in all material respects with
applicable environmental laws and regulations.”134
The court noted that statements of legal compliance are pled with
adequate falsity when documents detail specific violations of law existing at
the time the warranties were made.135 The court held the appellants'
complaint cited evidence of a number of violations of environmental laws
and regulations, including the Clean Water Act (evidenced by BP's 2007
guilty plea), Alaskan laws (evidenced by BP's civil settlement with the state),
and pipeline safety laws (evidenced by BP-Alaska's failure to comply with
PHMSA's COA).136 The court also held that, while the company may have
shown some effort to achieve compliance after the March spill, that effort
could not negate the egregious violations cited in the complaint.137
The court then looked at the question of whether BP could escape
possible liability by using the phrase “management believes” and the
qualifier “material compliance,” addressing the district court's finding that
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the statement was too “vague and ambiguous” to support the allegation of
falsity.138 While the court noted those terms weigh against falsity, it stated it
could not find any facts supporting management's “belief” in material
compliance given the severity of the violations of environmental law, of
which management was aware.139 The court held the fact of ongoing
“discussions” with regulators was insufficient to foster a belief in “material
compliance.”140 Thus, the court concluded the falsity of this statement was
adequately pled.141
To determine whether there was a strong inference of scienter, the
court applied the Berson absurdity test to determine whether it would be
absurd to suggest BP's management was unaware of BP's non-compliance
with environmental laws and regulations.142 The court noted the complaint
established the prominence of the issue of compliance: the complaint
referenced the fact the annual report discussed the spill and the CAO, as well
as the fact BP's then CEO requested updates on the company's response to the
spill.143 The court also noted the magnitude of the violations, the significant
public attention on BP following the spills, and the existence of
contemporaneous documents which demonstrated management's awareness
of BP's non-compliance with the CAO.144 On those grounds, the court held it
was absurd to claim management was not aware of BP's significant, ongoing
compliance issues that made the statement misleading.145
The court also held the language in the annual report contradicted an
inference of non-culpability.146 The opinion notes the language alerts
investors about the potential for future compliance issues to have an adverse
impact on the company, but puts the emphasis on unpredictable risks that
would not disproportionately affect BP, while denying belief in risks unique
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to the company in the spill's aftermath.147 The court held that in this context,
the statement appears to be made with the intent to downplay BP's noncompliance with existing laws and regulations.148 As such, there is a strong
inference of an intent to mislead investors regarding the March spill that is as
compelling as the opposing possibility that BP's top management lacked
information about the company's compliance problems.149
Thus, the court reversed the trial court with respect to all but one of
the four statements at issue on appeal.150
V. COMMENT
The immediate consequence of this appellate decision is to revive
shareholders’ securities fraud claims against BP. Based on the court’s
discussion of falsity and scienter with regards to BP’s statements, it seems
likely that on remand a trial court will now find BP liable for violation of §
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (assuming the other elements of
a 10b claim are met).151 Should the trial court find BP liable, BP’s damages
could equal the entire loss incurred in the value of class members’ stock in
BP during the class period (i.e. in the wake of the spills) if the plaintiffs can
prove full loss causation. The spills and resultant shutdown of production
allegedly caused a four percent decline in BP’s share price.152 Since the class
of plaintiffs includes pension and trust funds and investment banks,153 which
likely own large quantities of BP’s stock, the potential damages could be
quite significant.
This ruling serves to compound BP’s extensive legal problems
extending from the 2006 Alaskan oil spills and other spills, most notably the
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, for which BP was
also at fault.154 One can expect BP’s reputation to suffer again following a
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finding of liability in this case, among both investors and the public at large,
as it did after the Deepwater Horizon spill. However, it will by no means
break BP, especially considering the fact that the Deepwater Horizon spill,
which was much larger and more economically and environmentally harmful,
did not do so either.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached this decision by
following, and ultimately strengthening, precedent from other cases dealing
with the issue of securities fraud. This case is environmentally significant
because it is one of relatively few cases in which a set of environmentally
relevant facts was at the core of securities fraud litigation. Noteworthy is the
fact this is the first case in which the Ninth Circuit applied the Berson
absurdity test to such a set of environmental facts,155 which widens the
breadth of possibilities for showing scienter in this type of securities fraud
case in the future.
The Ninth Circuit Court’s application of precedent was proper here,
as the facts strongly suggest BP and its executives were dishonest with
regards to the spills at issue. The relevant public statements were either false
or materially misleading to investors and the rest of the public. The most
likely inference from the facts is that the statements were intentionally
dishonest, as opposed to the weak inference that the statements were simply
uninformed.
In Reese, the court weighed the policy interest of holding companies
accountable for knowingly making false statements to investors against the
high evidentiary burden for showing such statements were known to be false
at the time they were made and that the statements were made with the intent
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/business/bp-negligent-in-2010-oil-spill-us-judgerules.html?_r=0; Robert Force et al., Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil
Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L.
REV. 889 (Mar. 2011).
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to deceive or mislead investors. The court looked at the evidence of
securities fraud, direct and circumstantial, raised by the appellants and
balanced this against the possibility that the appellees’ statements were
unintentionally false. Ultimately, the court correctly decided in favor of
holding companies accountable for lying to investors, holding that BP’s and
its employees’ statements were actionable.
By this ruling, the court upheld the idea that companies that harm the
environment, and then lie about it, should be held liable for their fraudulent
behavior and for the harm to the environment itself. The ruling in Reese
serves as a warning to companies making statements about their
environmental impact, and more generally, to companies whose activities
have an impact on the environment. Specifically, the ruling is useful and
cautionary for companies who have a knowledgeable, on-the-ground
manager or executive charged with making statements to the public
concerning operations and policy. However, perhaps the most consequential
portion of the Ninth Circuit’s holding concerns the statements made in BP’s
annual report (“Management believes that the Group's activities are in
compliance with in all material respects with applicable environmental laws
and regulations”). This statement was most likely simple boilerplate
language, and yet the court held it was actionably deceptive, notwithstanding
the veil of qualifiers like “management believes” and “all material respects.”
Companies must now be very careful when making such broad, standardized
statements to investors as such provisions may still be actionable. On the
other side of the issue, ideally, investors can have more confidence with their
investments. Specifically, investors and the rest of the public should now be
able to have more faith in the assertions of publicly traded companies.
One can see how such qualifying language could have made the
statement in BP’s annual report not actionable with regards to scienter; or
how Johnson’s statements distinguishing the WOA and EOA lines were not
misleading because the lines’ similarities were a matter of public knowledge,
as the defense argued. However, the court held otherwise. One can also see
how the defense’s other arguments could also be plausible: it is possible
Johnson and other BP executives did not have full access to the relevant or
most recent data, or misinterpreted that data, and it is possible that some of
the statements at issue were based only on preliminary assessments or were
otherwise incomplete. However, the appellate court was correct in
remanding the case so that a trial court may determine the facts of the matter.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Through its holding in Reese, that BP’s statements to the public and
shareholders are actionable as securities fraud, the Ninth Circuit won an
indirect victory for the environment. This decision means BP’s attempts to
cover up its fault in harming the environment are now a potential source of
liability for BP. Based on the court’s analysis of the issues, it is likely a trial
court will find BP liable in this case.156 One can only hope this will deter
other companies from similar conduct in the future.
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